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I.   Introduction 
 Readers familiar with my research over the last decade will surely conclude that 
Richard Vedder and I live in two different worlds. This is not because my own book, 
Tuition Rising: Why College Costs So Much (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2002), deals primarily with college costs at selective private academic institutions and his 
book, Going Broke By Degree: Why College Costs Too Much (Washington DC: AEI 
Press, 2004), deals with college costs at public higher education institutions. Rather, it is 
because his and my views of the state of public higher education in the United States 
today are very different. So when offered the opportunity by the editor to write a review 
essay about Going Broke by Degree, I eagerly accepted and I will cite considerable 
evidence in this essay to support my views. 
 Many years ago, a friend, who is a long-time resident scholar at the American 
Enterprise Institute, told me that I would never have a major impact on public policy 
because liberals think I am conservative and conservatives think I am liberal. Another 
friend, a long-time senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, told me that the first friend 
had things exactly backwards; because people know that I do not start off with any ax to 
grind, they take my research much more seriously that they would if I always approached 
things from either the right or the left. In Going Broke by Degree, Richard Vedder always 
approaches things from the right and my overriding concern is that while the book often 
provides a good diagnosis of the issues facing public higher education, it also often is a 
polemic in which political philosophy, rather than empirical evidence, shapes statements 
and drives policy conclusions. Readers of Going Broke need to understand what 
statements are based on fact and what are based on philosophy and my essay seeks to 
help them do this.  
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 The introduction to Growing Broke sketches Vedder’s complete argument and I 
begin in the next section by summarizing this argument, without offering my own views. 
In section III, I provide a critique of some of the assertions made in the introduction. The 
remainder of my essay discusses each major section of Growing Broke. 
II. Going Broke By Degree: Why College Costs So Much- The Introduction 
   Vedder begins by noting that “productivity of university personnel is almost 
certainly falling” and that “The basic problem is that universities are mostly nonprofit 
organizations, subject only to muted competitive forces and lacking market-imposed 
discipline to economize and innovate” (p. xv). With third parties (government and 
donors) paying much of the cost, consumers (students) are relatively insensitive to costs 
and this reduces any incentives the institutions have to hold down costs. 
 Further pressures on tuition come from two types of cross-subsidizations that 
occur at academic institutions. First, institutional scholarship aid increasingly comes from 
tuition revenues and increases in this aid require higher tuition levels to pay for it. 
Second, teaching loads have gone down and increasingly institutions are diverting 
resources away from undergraduate instruction to allow professors to do more research 
(p. xvii). 
 While public university presidents claim that reductions in state support are the 
major factor responsible for their having to raise tuition, “more generous state support 
does not usually translate into lower tuition costs. Nor does it enable more students to 
attend college” (p. xviii). Rather, more generous state support is used to fund higher 
salaries, additional staff, more facilities and more research. Furthermore the evidence 
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suggests that when other factors are held constant, “the more state governments support 
higher education, the lower the rate of economic growth in the state” (p. xviii). 
 The financial benefits to individuals from going to college are considerable, 
which leads him to question why third parties, including governments, should finance 
most of the cost of college. There are three arguments that are traditionally given to 
justify public support of higher education and he rejects all three. First, there are positive 
externalities to higher education; he rejects this citing evidence that people tend to move 
from “university-intensive” states into states where less effort is put into higher education 
(p. xxi). Second, imperfect capital markets; he argues that this calls for direct financial 
support for students, not support for institutions. Finally, universities support functions 
other than undergraduate education, such as research, and these costs should not be 
charged to undergraduate students; he rejects the value of state sponsorship of research at 
public universities asserting that “There is some doubt, however, whether the university 
is a better venue for most research than, say, private laboratories or nonprofit institutions” 
(p. xxii) 
 Not surprisingly then, he argues that government should get out of the business of 
supporting public higher education, while increasing the support for students themselves 
through a voucher program, such as is currently being done in Colorado. The rest of the 
book is an elaboration of these assertions and the provision of “evidence” that supports 
his claims. 
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III. A Critique of the Introduction 
Before turning to the rest of the book, it is important for me to point out some 
fundamental differences between Vedder’s views of public higher education and public 
higher education as I know it. First, productivity is in the eyes of the beholder and 
Vedder’s eyes are only on the numbers of undergraduate students being educated per 
faculty and staff member at universities. Lost from his vision is any notion that research, 
graduate education and extension and public service activities have value. Lost also is 
any notion that the quality of what is being provided in higher education institutions has 
changed over time in a positive fashion. Spending resources on information technology 
(campus networks, staff) so that students can access the internet, register-on-line, access 
on-line library reserve lists and the like, has no value to him. Spending more money on 
student services, such as psychological counseling, is again something that universities 
should not be worrying about. 
 Gordon Winston has long pointed out that even if we ignore the explicit grant aid 
that some students receive, no undergraduate student attending public or private non 
profit higher education in the United States pays tuition and fees that cover the full cost 
of his or her education.1  In private higher education, the subsidies that all students 
receive come from endowment income, annual giving, government grants and the value 
of capital services that were paid for by previous giving and government grants. In public 
higher education, all the above plus direct government appropriations contribute to the 
subsidies that students receive. Thus, Vedder’s statement that undergraduate students are 
increasingly subsidizing research is simply incorrect – rather the statement should be that 
on average the sizes of the subsidies undergraduate students are receiving are somewhat 
                                                 
1 Gordon Winston (1999a) 
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smaller because a greater share of state appropriations to public universities and of state 
universities’ tuition revenues is going to support research. Moreover, estimates obtained 
by colleagues and I suggest that the effects of increased institutional expenditures on 
research on tuition levels and student/faculty ratios at public higher education institutions 
is quite modest.2
 Contrary to Vedder’s assertion, several careful econometric studies do suggest 
that increases in state support per student to public higher education institutions are 
associated with smaller increases in public tuition levels.3 Moreover, the evidence is 
compelling that the resource base of public higher education institutions has declined 
relative to the resource base of private higher education during the last 30 years.4  For 
example, in the late 1970s, the average full professor at a public doctoral university 
earned about 91% of what the average full professor at a private doctoral university 
earned. By 2003-2004, this percentage had fallen to under 78%.5 As salaries in public 
higher education institutions fall in relative terms these institutions are increasingly 
having difficulty attracting and retaining top faculty.6 This surely influences the quality 
of education being offered undergraduate students at public institutions (more on this 
point below). 
 As Vedder asserts, it has been well-documented that public higher education 
institutions are devoting a greater share of their institutional resources to research and a 
smaller share to undergraduate education.7 However, this is in response to governors and 
                                                 
2 Ronald Ehrenberg, Michael Rizzo and George Jakubson (forthcoming) 
3 Michael Rizzo and Ronald Ehrenberg (2004), Robert Lowry (2001a, 2001b) 
4 Thomas Kane and Peter Orzag (2003) 
5 Ronald Ehrenberg (2004a) 
6 Ronald Ehrenberg (2003) 
7 Roger Geiger (2004). 
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state legislatures that increasingly expect their public institutions to conduct research that 
will serve as a vehicle for economic development. Why do politicians take such a 
different view about the importance of their supporting research at their public 
universities than Vedder does? Perhaps, it is because the available evidence suggests that 
knowledge spillovers are often local in nature. For example, citations in patent 
applications to existing domestic patents are more likely to come from the same state and 
SMSA of the cited patent.8  Perhaps it is because the available evidence suggests that 
there is a multiplier effect of state support for university research, in terms of the increase 
in federal and other external research dollars that these investments generate.9
IV. Going Broke By Degree: Part I- The Problem 
Vedder begins chapter 1 in Going Broke with a discussion of the cost explosion in 
higher education. The discussion here is not confined to public higher education, 
although most of the policy conclusions in the book deal with public higher education. 
He also does not make clear here that tuition increases and cost increases are two 
different concepts. This is an important distinction because tuition increases in private 
higher education have invariably been associated with increases in expenditures per 
student, but tuition increases in public higher education are much less tightly related to 
increases in expenditures per student because public tuition increases often are associated 
with cut backs in state appropriations per student. 
  He does note (p. 7) that actual tuition increases may overstate the quality adjusted 
price of attending college because of changes in the nature of the college experience (as I 
have described above). However, he discounts this possibility and instead points to 
                                                 
8 Adam Jaffe et. al. (1993) 
9 Ehrenberg, Rizzo and Jakubson ( forthcoming) 
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evidence of declining higher education quality, such as more students taking 5 or more 
years to earn bachelors’ degrees, a decline in the scores of students taking the Graduate 
Records Examination, and an increase in the share of students taught by graduate student 
and part-time faculty. Declining college graduation rates may well be due to the 
increasing share of American college students that must work part-time while enrolled in 
college as federal grant aid programs have not kept pace with tuition increases, while the 
GRE findings may be due to the changing composition of students taking the exam (e.g. 
more foreign students, a greater share of American college graduates going on for post 
graduate education), so neither says anything about college quality. Careful research 
needs to be undertaken on both of these issues before jumping to conclusions about 
changes in higher education’s quality. 
 I share Vedder’s concern about the growing use of part-time faculty and have 
recently provided evidence that the increased use of part-time and full-time non tenure-
track faculty is associated with lower graduation rates and higher drop out rates, with the 
magnitudes of the effects being largest at public comprehensive universities.10 Somewhat 
surprising to me, Vedder does not make the connection here that budget tightness at the 
publics, occasioned by limitations in state support, is responsible for this growing use of 
contingent faculty. 
 Next Vedder presents information to show that tuition has grown relative to 
family incomes, even if one takes account of the growth of institutional and other forms 
of grant aid given to students, Again these data refer to all higher education; not just to 
public higher education. The simple supply and demand analysis that follows about why 
                                                 
10 Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Liang Zhang (forthcoming). Recent research by Eric Bettinger and Bridget 
Long (2004) using individual level data from Ohio public institutions does not yield as negative 
conclusions about the impact of the use of contingent faculty on students.  
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tuition has risen so much is well worth reading, although his claim that the tuition tax 
credits provided by the federal government in the late 1990s led to dollar for dollar 
increases in tuition levels has not been substantiated by empirical research.11  
 At the end of chapter 1, Vedder asks the question, “How have universities utilized 
their enhanced revenues?” (p. 23). It is probably useful to point out here that the real state 
appropriations per student at public higher education institutions grew in constant dollars 
from $5622 in fiscal year 1974 to $6717 in fiscal year 2004 – an average increase of only 
0.6% a year.12 Indeed, the share of state budgets devoted to public higher education has 
fallen by over one-third during the period.13 While there are many reasons why state 
support for public higher education has not kept up with state resources, the increases in 
state appropriations per student for higher education have been insufficient to keep up 
with the rising costs of higher education. 
 Vedder moves in chapter 2 to a discussion about why universities are inefficient 
and costly. Many of these forces and others were discussed in Tuition Rising and what he 
describes applies equally to private and public higher education. What he does not 
highlight is an important difference between public and private higher education. In most 
states public tuition levels are explicitly, or implicitly, under the control of the political 
process. For even in situation in which the trustees of the university formally control 
tuition (such as in New York State), they will only recommend tuition increases that the 
governor and state legislature will support because the trustees understand that if they 
recommend higher tuition increases the political process can compensate by cutting their 
state appropriation. So increases in public tuition levels should be understood as being at 
                                                 
11 Bridget Long (2004) 
12 Ronald Ehrenberg (2004b) 
13 Michael Rizzo (2004a) 
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least tacitly approved by the political process; it is not simply public university 
administrators going wild and seeking rents for themselves and their faculty. 
 I stress this point because chapter 3 deals with why productivity has declined (in 
Vedder’s view) in higher education and the rent seeking behavior of participants in the 
process.  He shows that during the last quarter of the 20th century the shares of public 
university spending nationally going to research and administration rose, while the shares 
going to instruction and plant operations declined (table 3.2). Similarly, while full-time 
equivalent employment per full-time equivalent students at universities has increased 
during the same period, only a small increase in faculty occurred and the major increase 
was in the other professional category (table 3.3). The growth was larger in private higher 
education than it was in public higher education, but even at the publics employment per 
student grew. 
 Does this indicate declining faculty productivity and rent seeking behavior by 
administrators? Vedder believes yes but there are alternative explanations. Much of the 
growth in spending on research comes from the growth of external funds provided to 
public universities from the federal government, corporations and foundations for 
research; these funds are not available to be used for other purposes. Much of the growth 
of administration may be due to changes in legal requirements (environmental 
regulations, occupational safety and health, federal and state auditing requirements, 
research grant compliance and monitoring) and many of these employees’ salaries are 
charged to external funding sources, not to state appropriations and tuition revenues. 
Much of the growth of administration is also due to the changing nature of where 
universities look for revenues (increases in staff in the development and alumni relations 
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functions) and where they send their students off-campus (study abroad offices). Much of 
the growth of other professionals may lie in the information technology area. Sadly the 
world higher education faces is increasingly complex and thus the need for administrators 
and other professionals is ever increasing. Similarly, the expectations placed on public 
universities by their state governments have also changed; as I have noted the expectation 
that research conducted by the university will be an engine for economic development in 
the state has increased. 
 It is in this chapter that Vedder provides his detailed analyses of changes in GRE 
test scores and changes in the shares of students graduating in five year; I have already 
explained why these analyses have little to say about university productivity. He also 
provides some back of the envelope calculations of the value of university research; he is 
dubious of the value of most research. Finally, he provides extensive data on faculty 
compensation changes over time and tries to debunk the myth (in his view) that real 
faculty pay has been stagnating over time (p. 62).  
 This latter analysis is based on a comparison of average faculty salary increases 
with changes in the consumer price index, an adjustment of the consumer price index for 
inflationary bias, and an adjustment for the failure of average faculty salary data to 
correct for growth in employee benefits. No where does he mention that the data on 
faculty compensation that he is using apply only to full-time faculty and the share of 
faculty who are full-time has been steadily decreasing during the period. No where does 
he mention, as I have already discussed above, that average faculty salaries in public 
higher education have fallen substantially relative to average faculty salaries in private 
higher education. No where does he mention that the share of American college graduates 
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going on for PhDs has declined substantially over time; at least partially due to the 
decreased attractiveness of academia as a career and the decreased chance of new PhDs 
attaining tenure track positions.14 No where does he discuss how earnings in alternative 
professional occupations have dramatically increased, which further reduces the 
attractiveness of PhD study and academic careers.15 If things were as cushy in academia 
as Vedder and other critics of higher education believe, I would not be spending so much 
of my time worrying about how to attract the next generation of talented students into 
academic careers and involving undergraduate students in research early in their college 
careers to try to interest them in pursuing PhD study.16
 In chapter 4, Vedder switches to a discussion of some of the unique characteristics 
of American higher education.  Price discrimination is one- and he discusses need based 
financial aid and merit based financial aid. Other forms of discrimination discussed 
include preferences in admission for athletes, alumni children and under represented 
minority students. 
 More relevant to his concern about college costs is his discussion of the tenure 
system. He understands some of the benefits of the tenure system, such as academic 
freedom, but his focus is on the well-known costs of tenure. As a labor economist, I view 
tenure as a desirable job characteristic and expect that in the absence of tenure, 
universities would have to pay higher salaries to attract individuals into faculty positions. 
Indeed, a study that I did a few years ago with Rachel Willis and Paul Pieper showed 
that, other factors held constant, economics departments that offered low tenure 
                                                 
14 Ronald Ehrenberg (2005) 
15 Derek Bok (2002) 
16 Ronald Ehrenberg (2005) 
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probabilities to their assistant professors had to pay higher salaries to attract them.17 And, 
as I have already noted, the fraction of faculty members with tenure or on tenure-track 
lines has been steadily decreasing in the United States. 
 The final topic covered in chapter 4 is cross-subsidization; a topic that has been 
addressed before by many scholars.18 Some departments that teach a lot of students, such 
as economics, subsidize other departments, such as classics. Some departments have 
higher costs per student than other departments because of differences in instructional 
technologies (e.g. laboratories in the sciences) and Vedder wonders why universities tend 
to charge uniform tuitions across disciplines. Although some economists have modeled 
differential tuition by majors, the standard answer is that universities would like their 
students to choose their academic subjects based upon interest, not based upon cost.19
 More important to him is the cross-subsidization of research and graduate 
education by undergraduate education. Remembering Gordon Winston’s dicta that no 
undergraduate student at public or private higher education institutions bears the full cost 
of his or her education, the issue here is really one of the sizes of the subsidies to each 
activity. So too is Vedder’s concern, shared by many other observers (including me), that 
many institutions are spending much too much money on intercollegiate athletics and that 
some cost savings could be achieved in this area. 
V. Going Broke By Degree – Part II: Have Our Universities Lost Their Way?   
Having discussed why costs are increasing in American higher education, the next 
section of Going Broke begins to look more broadly at American higher education. 
Chapter 5 provides information on historical growth in university enrollments, including 
                                                 
17 Ronald Ehrenberg, Paul Pieper and Rachel Willis (1998) 
18 See, for example, Estelle James (1986) 
19 Stephen Hoenack  and William Weiler (1975)  
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the growth in enrollment per population age 18 to 24, the growth in graduate enrollments 
relative to undergraduate enrollments, the increasing share of nontraditional students, the 
increasing internationalization of our student bodies (especially at the graduate level), the 
increasing share of students that are female, the changing racial/ethnic composition of our 
student bodies, the changes in the shares of students attending 2-year colleges and the 
changing share of students enrolled at private universities. While private enrollments fell 
relative to public enrollments between 1955 and 1980, between 1980 and 2000 the share 
of students enrolled at the privates increased slightly, with some of this growth coming in 
the for-profit sector (which caters to nontraditional students seeking professional 
training).20
 Perhaps the most interesting discussion in this chapter deals with interstate 
differences in the proportion of the adult population that has college degrees. Vedder 
shows that this proportion varies across states with income levels and that while the 
proportion grew in all states between 1980 and 2002, interstate differences in the 
proportion did not decline substantially during the period (table 5.11). The correlation 
between educational attainment and income in a state does not imply causation and he 
will return to discuss this issue more in chapter 7. 
 Chapter 6 deals with why our nation needs colleges and universities at all. Vedder 
identifies two primary functions the dissemination and the production of knowledge. 
However, he stresses, and this leads to the subject of the next chapter, that higher 
education institutions do not have a monopoly on either function and that as universities 
become more costly they run the risk of the seeing more competition from other cheaper 
substitutes. Clearly the growth of proprietary institutions fits neatly here. 
                                                 
20 Gordon Winston (1999b) 
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 Chapter 7 is one of the most important in the book for it is in this chapter that 
Vetter makes the argument that the purported social benefits of higher education are 
overstated. Put simply, this is the chapter that provides the foundation for his policy 
prescriptions that are described in the final section of Going Broke. Social benefits of 
higher education are benefits that accrue to individuals other than the recipients of higher 
education and there actually is evidence by others that these benefits exist.21 For example, 
in several careful studies Enrico Moretti has shown that as the share of college graduates 
in an area (or employed in a plant) increases, the earnings of non college graduates in the 
area (or employed at the plant) also increases.22
 Vetter conducts his own analyses of the social benefit issue using state level data 
during the 1977 to 2002 period and finds that while there is a strong positive relationship 
between the percentage of college graduates in a state in 1980 and the growth rate of 
income in the state during the 25 year period, there is a much weaker correlation between 
changes in the percentage of college graduates during the period and the growth rate of 
income (table 7.1). He takes this to imply that the social benefits to higher education, as 
measured by income growth in the community, may have existed in the past, but that they 
are diminishing now. Moreover, when he regresses the growth rate of income in the state 
on the change in state and local higher education spending (as a share of personal income 
in the state), he finds a negative, not a positive relationship, when other factors are held 
constant (table 7.2). Taken at face value, his results here (and later in the chapter when he 
conducts some case studies) suggest that increased state spending on higher education is 
associated with lower income growth rates. 
                                                 
21 Michael Rizzo (2004b) provides an overview of these studies 
22 Enrico Moretti (2004a) (2004b) 
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 Of course there may be a chicken vs. egg problem here. Those states that may 
have increased their spending (as a share of state income) the most may be the states 
whose growth rates would have otherwise been below average. Thus, the relationship 
may run from low projected growth rates of income to decisions to spend more on higher 
education, rather than visa versa. Sadly, Vetters’s attempts to subject his model to some 
sensitivity analyses (p. 138 to 141) do not include testing this hypothesis. 
 Vetter does find in this chapter that there is only a weak positive relationship 
between the level of state spending for public higher education in a state and the 
proportion of its graduates that have college degrees (table 7.3). This is because college 
educated labor is mobile and moves to where its return is highest. Much more detailed 
and careful studies than his have already made this point.23 However, to say that 
individual states do not reap most of the benefits of their investments in public higher 
education, due to the mobility of college educated labor across states, is not to say that 
that it is socially optimal for the public sector to invest less (which is the conclusion that 
Vetter wants to draw). Rather, inadvertently, Vetter may have made the case for greater 
federal investment in higher education. For if, as Moretti finds, there are social benefits to 
higher levels of education in our society as a whole, the relevant funder should be the 
level of government that can reap the benefits, the federal government. 
VI. Going Broke – Part III- Solutions 
Vedder surveys the changing landscape of higher education in chapter 8 and discusses 
alternatives that may help to hold down rates of tuition increases in the future. These 
include the growing competition from proprietary (for-profit) degree granting institutions, 
the growth of distance learning and the growth of alternative forms of certification that 
                                                 
23 John Bound et. al. (2004) and Jeffrey Groen (2004) 
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may reduce the need for formal college degrees (for example major companies having 
their own certification processes in the information technology field). 
 In chapter 9, he then discusses policies that institutions might pursue to hold down 
instructional cost increases. These include increasing student-faculty ratios by increasing 
the teaching loads of faculty members, making better use of technology, changing the 
tenure system by introducing more systematic post-tenure reviews and providing 
alternatives to tenure (higher salaries for those willing to accept appointments without 
tenure), cutting and consolidating costly programs, including marginal PhD programs. 
Some of these proposals will make it more difficult to attract new people into PhD study 
(e.g. increasing teaching loads in academia), but all are worth thinking about. So too are 
his proposals for other forms of cost reduction – efforts to reduce bureaucracy and the 
size of non instructional staff,  contracting out and privatization of  services and reform of 
intercollegiate athletics. 
 I must caution here, however, that the growth of non instructional staff has been at 
least partially driven by the growth of external funds coming into universities (e.g. 
research grants) and reducing externally funded employment will not lead to institutional 
cost savings. Similarly, while privatization of non instructional services are worth 
considering, some institutions that have moved in this direction have found that they 
could not both achieve the cost savings that they wanted and maintain the quality of the 
services provided to students and thus have moved back to direct university operations.24
This is not the place to debate his call for the end of formal affirmative action 
programs; this debate has much more to do with broader issues of the goals of public 
higher education and social justice than it does with cost savings. Moreover, the public 
                                                 
24 David Kirp (2002) 
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debate, as articulated in the recent Supreme Court case, has shifted from a focus on 
affirmative action to a focus on diversity and the benefits of a diversified student body to 
the educations of all students.25  
To further improve productivity, Vetter would encourage efforts to reduce drop out 
rates and reduce times to degree at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Policies 
here would include tying state support to graduation rates and restricting state support per 
student provided to a university to perhaps four years in college per student. He also calls 
for more serious grading standards, although this may directly conflict with his desire to 
reduce drop out rates and times-to-degree. Indeed, further grade inflation may be an 
unintended consequence of his financing proposals. 
All of these changes would at best be marginal and would be resisted in Vedder’s 
view, by faculty and administrators. So in chapter 10 he proposes alternative systematic 
reforms. The first would be to reduce state support to their public universities and instead 
provide tuition vouchers directly to students; this is a reform currently underway in the 
state of Colorado. Institutions would then have to compete for students to get the tuition 
vouchers. To make such a proposal palatable to people concerned with educational 
access, the size of the voucher could be tied to a student’s financial circumstances. In the 
extreme case, all public support would be in the form of vouchers, there would be no 
direct support to the public institutions. 
Such a proposal is based upon the belief that the goal of public higher education is 
simply to provide private economic returns to the undergraduate students that attend their 
institutions. No funding is provided for extension or public service activities, nor is any 
explicit funding provided for research or graduate education. The size of vouchers would 
                                                 
25 Peter Schmidt (2003) 
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go up by no more than the rate of inflation to help force public universities to hold their 
costs down (of course the reader should remember that state appropriations per student to 
public higher education have barely exceeded this rate of increase over the last 30 years 
anyway).  
Moreover, should one be concerned that a university would have to drop costly 
activities that are not self supporting, such as perhaps its classics department?  If these 
activities are truly desirable, Vedder believes that private philanthropy will be the source 
of funding. 
Once the voucher plan is on the table, the next logical step, which Vedder takes is to 
extend it to private higher education institutions as well. After all, if the return to higher 
education is solely a private return, students should be free to choose whatever institution 
they feel will benefit them the most. To provide some transition protection to public 
higher education institutions, the extension to privates would be phased in over time. The 
voucher would have only a fractional value at privates during the first few years and then 
would gradually rise to the level of the public voucher. At that point in time, privatization 
of public higher education would be complete and publics and privates would compete on 
what Vedder believes would be a level playing field. 
Of course Vedder’s argument ignores a number of important points. First, if vouchers 
were extended to private higher education, their cost to state government would soar 
(remember about one-third of all four-year college students are educated at private 
institutions), unless the size of the vouchers were reduced proportionately. If this were 
done, the support that publics would receive from the vouchers would decline even more 
and the publics would be squeezed financially even further. 
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Second, replacing state appropriations by vouchers does not reduce the public 
universities need for tuition revenues. The vouchers only make up (partially in the case of 
Colorado) for the cut back in state support and, absent increases in state support, tuition 
at the publics will have to continue to rise. Inflationary cost increases affect the whole 
public university budget, not simply the share of the budget that comes from state 
appropriations or vouchers. 
Finally, to say that the publics and the privates would be playing on a level playing 
field ignores the vast differences in annual giving and endowments that exists between 
public and private higher education. The sums that would be necessary to raise the 
endowment per student levels at public universities to the levels that exist at private 
universities are mind-boggling and most certainly not attainable. For example, John 
Wiley, the Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison has calculated that his 
institution would need an 8-fold increase in its endowments, from $1 billion to $8 billion 
to make up for the loss of its state support.26  
If a voucher scheme can not be implemented, Vedder proposes a set of second-best 
solutions; explicit controls on tuition increases, more explicitly tying increases in state 
appropriations to moderation in tuition increases (as I have already indicated this is done 
in practice in most states), eliminating tuition tax credits for students attending 
institutions whose rates of tuition increases are large, reducing tax deductions for 
charitable giving to institutions whose rates of tuition increase are too large, reducing 
state appropriations for graduate education and research and mandating cost reductions. 
In evaluating these schemes it is worth noting the preference that many give to private 
institutions. To see why, suppose that penalties (in terms of reduced tax credits or 
                                                 
26 Brian Howell (2003) 
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reduced tax deductions) go into effect if tuition increases exceed the rate of inflation and 
the rate of inflation is 4% in a year.  A private institution with an initial tuition level of 
$30,000 can raise its tuition per student by $1,200 and not be subject to any penalty. A 
public institution whose tuition is initially $4,000 a year and that faces no increase in 
state appropriations in the year, would receive an additional $400 a year in tuition per 
student (only one –third the amount that its private counterpart received) if it raised its 
tuition by 10 percent and it would be subject to the penalty. Invariably such schemes 
would penalize public higher education relative to private higher education and would 
lead to a further decline in the relative quality of public higher education institutions. 
The final chapter of Going Broke summarizes all of the key arguments and policy 
recommendations that Vedder had made. In this chapter, Vedder comes out and explicitly 
says what he has hinted at throughout the book. “Externalities are hard to measure, but 
the statistically significant negative correlation between university funding and economic 
growth in the United States suggest that, at the minimum, state funding should be 
reduced, if not eliminated” (p.216). Put simply, in his view the return to undergraduate 
education is purely a private one, and there is no social return to graduate education, 
research, or extension and public service activities either. 
So if you do read Going Broke, be careful to separate out in your own mind what is 
hard analysis from what is Vedder’s preconceived view on the proper role of government. 
As I have tried to indicate, many of the policy recommendations in Going Broke are 
based on the latter; not on the former. 
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